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Executive Summary
Collaboration among industry, government, and medicine in the pursuit of clinical research is critical to driving scientific progress, particularly as industry increasingly replaces
government as the primary source of research funding. However, the compensation methodologies employed by industry, as well as other financial relationships between industry and
physicians, create potential conflicts of interest that possibly jeopardize the rights and wellbeing of research participants as well as the integrity of research results.
While the landscape of clinical research has changed dramatically – the number of trials
has increased, industry funds a larger proportion of research, and more research now occurs
in physicians’ private offices – federal policy on recruitment and enrollment, and conflicts of
interest in research more generally, has not changed substantially.
In this White Paper, we make the following recommendations for reform of public policy
and industry practice:

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
General Principles
•

The goal for public policy should be to structure physician-investigator payment to achieve
financial neutrality between treatment and research, thus ensuring that a physician’s
decision to conduct clinical research, as well as his or her decision to recommend that
a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, is grounded in reasons unrelated to
investigator compensation.

•

Public policy in this area should be developed in the first instance through the regulatory
process, to facilitate careful identification and discussion of the issues and to facilitate the
development of best practice models. Reform through the prosecutorial process leads to
an undue focus on outlier cases, lacks transparency, and does not include the voices of all
relevant stakeholders.

Compensation for Research
••

Per Capita and Global Payments: Current federal policy does not provide sufficient
guidance about the principles or methodology by which to determine the “fair market
value” of a physician-investigator’s services in the clinical research context. Government
regulations providing guidance on investigator compensation should seek to achieve financial neutrality as between treatment and research. The fair market value of physician
time in the clinical research context should track the fair market value of physician time
spent engaged in clinical work. In order to avoid a disincentive for physicians to conduct
research, compensation for clinical trial work should include delineated reimbursement for
expenses, such as screening interviews or tests and data monitoring and reporting, that do
not arise in the clinical context.

••

Finder’s Fees and Bonuses for Recruitment and Retention: The federal government
should bar the following: any payment solely for a referral to a research trial, any payment
methodology that conditions payment for expenses attendant to screening potential participants on the individual enrolling in the trial, and all bonuses for recruiting or retaining
a certain number of participants. These types of payments create conflicts of interest that
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can incentivize investigators to recruit and retain individuals who do not meet the study’s
inclusion and exclusion criteria or to deemphasize information that might discourage individuals from consenting to trial enrollment.
••

Payment with Equity Interests: The federal government should also prohibit compensation for research in the form of an equity interest in the sponsor of a clinical trial.

Other Conflicts of Interest in Research
•

The current framework for federal policy to oversee investigators’ conflicts of interest
should be revised to specify certain conflicts that will disqualify a researcher from serving as an investigator. For example, holdings by investigators or their immediate family
members that provide a direct interest in the outcome of the research, such as stock or
stock options in a privately held company or equity in a publicly traded company above a
de minimis amount, should be barred. Compelling circumstances may justify individuals
with such interests to perform consulting services on matters related to the trial, but any
such cases should be reported to the Food & Drug Administration prior to the trial’s commencement. The same policy should also apply to intellectual property interests in a drug,
device or other product investigated by the clinical trial.

•

Federal regulations should require that all other conflicts of interest, arising from the varied and frequent financial relationships between industry and physicians, be identified and
managed.

Enhancing Institutional Oversight of Conflicts of Interest
•

2

Federal regulations should be amended to require the following:
•

At the commencement of research, institutions should evaluate relationships between
industry and physician-investigators to determine if the magnitude and form of the individual’s financial interest with the sponsor, the longevity of the relationship, or other
factors suggest that there is a conflict of interest requiring elimination, reduction, or
management.

•

Investigators should be required to report all financial interests, irrespective of amount,
to an institutional committee for review, rather than leaving it up to investigators to determine if the interest could reasonably be expected to affect the research. Institutions
should also be required to establish internal databases that investigators must update
as information changes about their financial relationships with for-profit entities.

•

Individual institutions should have the discretion to determine whether to create a
special conflicts of interest committee to review and manage individual investigators’
conflicts of interest or whether to delegate those responsibilities to the institutional
review board (IRB).

•

For research conducted in academic medical centers, a committee of the board of
directors, including members independent of management and the faculty, should
oversee institutional conflicts of interest in research. The board committee’s oversight
should extend beyond the primary institutions, such as the medical school or university, to any not-for-profit institutes or for-profit corporate entities that are substantially
controlled by or operate under the auspices of the medical school or university.
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Overseeing Conflicts of Interest Outside of Academic Medical Centers
•

Review and management of investigator or institutional conflicts of interest prior to the
time that research begins should be mandated by regulation and subject to contemporaneous government oversight.

•

Federal regulations should charge IRBs with review of conflicts of interest held by investigators and entities conducting research in community settings. Federal regulations should
provide clear guidance to IRBs about the nature and scope of information they should
review, the standards for the review, and the alternatives for eliminating, minimizing, or
managing a conflict, both for investigators and institutions. Federal regulations should
also spell out clearly the obligation of community-based physicians acting as investigators
or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for research
and other financial interests to IRBs.

Achieving Transparency
•

Federal law should require disclosure of payments for conducting clinical trials and other
relevant financial interests. Specifically, before research commences, research sponsors
should report to the Food & Drug Administration and recipients of federal grants should
report to the granting federal agency relevant equity and ownership interests as well as all
payments, above a de minimis amount, to the investigator and the investigator’s institution
or practice group by the company whose product is under review in the clinical trial.

Enhanced Training for Investigators
•

Federal regulation should require that training about the nature of conflicts of interest, their
potential for harm, and the ways that conflicts can be managed, reduced, or eliminated
should be mandatory for all investigators who conduct clinical research within and outside
of academic medical centers. For physician-investigators outside of academic medicine,
training should also cover key elements of research: the importance of inclusion and exclusion criteria and informed consent, the ethical and scientific issues posed by particular
research methods such as double blind placebo-controlled studies, and their obligations as
an investigator as compared with those of a treating physician.
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INTRODUCTION
The collaboration between industry and medicine in the arena of clinical research is
critical to driving scientific progress. This collaboration leads to the production of drugs and
devices to prevent, diagnose, and cure illness, as well as innovations that prolong the lives and
improve the quality of life of seriously ill patients. Investigators, both inside and outside of
academic medical centers, depend on industry funds to advance clinical research to break new
barriers in patient care. This reliance on industry to fund research and innovation has brought
with it increasing financial ties between drug and device companies and the physicians and
institutions who conduct research.
Recent media coverage, government reports, and the academic literature have highlighted the pervasive nature of conflicts of interest between medicine and industry in treatment,
medical education, and scientific publication.1 Congressional investigations, government prosecutions, and press reports revealing the nature and extent of these conflicts have led to calls
for reform.2 Most recently, congressional inquiries have focused on “ghostwriting,” the preparation of articles on research findings undertaken by industry, and attributed to scholars paid
to lend their names to the reported results.3 Reform measures and proposals have focused on
greater transparency in the financial relationships between pharmaceutical and medical device
companies on the one hand and physicians and health care facilities on the other.4 State legislatures have taken the lead in barring certain activities that create conflicts, such as gifts, meals,
and other financial benefits for physicians.5 However, substantial conflicts in clinical research
remain unaddressed.
This White Paper focuses on conflicts of interest in the research context; specifically
those that potentially affect physicians in their roles as investigators overseeing clinical trials.
Conflicts of interest in this context have the potential to affect the rights and interests of those
who volunteer to participate in clinical trials. When investigators have financial interests in
the outcome of the research or stand to gain substantially from conducting a clinical trial, it
may affect their judgment throughout the conduct of the trial, including the many judgments
that must be made during the process of enrolling and recruiting individuals to participate as
research subjects. Potential participants can be harmed by recruitment practices that insufficiently inform them of the risks of the study, ignore medical conditions that place them at risk
in the trial, or encourage them to discontinue or forego a treatment regimen likely to be better
for them than the regimen being evaluated in the trial. Manufacturers have also conducted
studies as a way of introducing physicians to their products and obtaining the physicians’ brand
loyalty, rather than as a genuine scientific inquiry.6 Even if enrollees are not physically harmed
in these studies, they are asked to participate in research that is a sham, violating the trust
they have placed in the researchers who recruited them. Such studies undermine the integrity
of the research enterprise; public revelation of the studies is likely to diminish willingness to
participate in research.
Moreover, the scientific integrity and validity of the research results may be impaired
whenever a financial conflict influences the judgment of physician-researchers in the recruitment and enrollment process. Each clinical trial has a protocol that enumerates the eligibility
criteria for trial participation. If physicians recruit individuals who do not meet a study’s inclusion and exclusion criteria, for example because their disease is not of the severity specified in
the study protocol or because they take certain medications the protocol prohibits, the resultant
study data may not be valid.

4

Seton Hall Law

The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
The emphasis of this White Paper is on the conflicts of interest that arise when physician-investigators or the institutions under whose auspices clinical trials are conducted have a
financial incentive to enroll individuals in clinical research or a financial relationship with the
trial sponsor that potentially threatens the objectivity of their decisions regarding the pursuit
of such research. We also recognize the negative consequences that may exist when compensation for research is so inadequate that it discourages physicians and institutions from
conducting research at all. A recent New York Times article reported that the “great majority”
of oncologists decline to participate in clinical trials because “[t]hey make little or nothing on
trials and, in fact, often lose money.”7 Clearly, financial incentives and disincentives alike have
the potential to influence physicians’ judgment in the recruitment and enrollment process.8
In analyzing investigator over-compensation, we address both the specific reimbursement for a particular trial as well as, in some contexts, the totality of the physician’s financial
relationship with the trial sponsor. This White Paper argues that the goal for public policy
should be to structure physician-investigator payment to achieve financial neutrality between
treatment and research. This approach would ensure that a physician’s decision to conduct
clinical research, as well as his or her decision to recommend that a particular patient participate in a clinical trial, is grounded in reasons unrelated to investigator compensation.
Evolving market realities underscore the importance of public policies to address conflicts of interest, especially as they relate to enrollment and recruitment. Pressures to develop
health care products, obtain government approval, and bring them to market as quickly as
possible have increased in recent years. This pressure extends to testing new products and
the need to recruit and enroll more participants into research. These market forces are likely
to intensify as patents for blockbuster drugs expire, drug pipelines dwindle, and companies
face the current economic downturn. Potential health care and patent reform create additional
uncertainties for drug and device makers.
The number of clinical trials in the United States has climbed dramatically in recent
years. Between 2000 and 2006, clinical trials increased from 40,000 to 59,000 – a nearly 50
percent jump.9 At the same time, the Food & Drug Administration’s (FDA) heightened attention to ensuring that products are safe before granting marketing approval has led to more trials
in each development phase, to more participants in each trial, and to increasingly complicated
protocols, all of which heighten recruitment hurdles.10 Nearly a third of clinical trial time –
more than any other clinical trial activity – is spent recruiting participants.11 Moreover, recruitment and enrollment problems lead to nearly half of all clinical trial delays, with more than
70% of clinical trials delayed from one to six months.12 These delays increase drug and device
companies’ out-of-pocket expenses and run down the clock on the period during which companies can earn government-protected monopoly profits for sale of the products being studied.
The current economic climate presents additional challenges for policymakers concerned
with protecting the rights and interests of prospective research participants throughout the
recruitment and enrollment process. Illness, economic circumstances, and other situational
factors can create or exacerbate vulnerabilities of research participants. Individuals living
in poverty or without health insurance are disproportionately likely to participate in clinical
research.13 Under-employment and loss of health insurance make clinical trials appealing to
some potential participants who otherwise would not consider enrolling but are attracted by the
promise of payment or free health care attendant to the trial. Recent media reports reveal that
growing numbers of healthy individuals are turning to Phase I trials (in which drugs are tested
in humans for the first time) to earn money;14 this type of trial attracts primarily low-income
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minority men.15 Even before the economic downturn, press reports noted that some lower
socio-economic class individuals, often immigrants, rely on clinical research as their primary
source of income.16 The ranks of clinical trial participants also include many individuals, predominantly uninsured white women, who choose to participate in Phase II or III trials in part
to obtain health care.17
The clinical trial system necessarily relies on the physician-investigators who conduct
research to serve as trustworthy gatekeepers, protecting both the integrity of the research as
well as the health and welfare of the individuals upon whom the experimental products are being tested. However, as the drug and device industry has funded a growing share of clinical
research, physician-investigators are increasingly the recipients of financial incentives creating conflicts that may undermine their ability to serve in this role. Before 1980, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) funded most medical research.18 In the 1980s, however, NIH funding fell and drug industry funding rose six-fold.19 Today, drug and medical device companies
fund up to 80% to 90% of all clinical trials; in 2005, industry invested 78% more in research
and development than did the federal government.20 Although the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act allotted $8.2 billion dollars to the NIH for research,21 this stimulus funding
is a one-time infusion of money, and is slated to end in September 2010. As a result, industry
will continue to serve as the primary source of funding for clinical research.
As funding for clinical research has shifted, its locus has as well. In addition to academic medical centers, research is now conducted in community hospitals, doctors’ offices,
and research institutes.22 By 2004, nearly 75% of the clinical research sites sponsored by
industry were physicians in private practice or for-profit research centers.23 Between 1994
and 2004, academic medical centers fell from 63% to 26% of sites where clinical research is
conducted.24 The shift away from academic medical centers creates several distinct concerns
about financial conflicts of interest, primarily because when physicians in private practice
conduct industry-funded research, they may profit directly and personally from recruiting,
enrolling, and retaining patients in research.25 Community-based physician-investigators also
generally have less training and experience conducting clinical trials than those in academic
medicine.26 In addition, community-based physicians are likely to recruit their own patients
to participate in clinical trials.27 Combined with the high level of trust patients place in their
personal physicians,28 this heightens the risk that prospective participants might agree to enroll
in a trial without making an independent evaluation of its risks and benefits. The phenomenon
of the therapeutic misconception may also arise, whereby research participants do not understand the distinction between treatment – proposed or provided by their physician solely for
their benefit – and research, which may provide clinical benefits for participants in some trials,
but is not designed primarily to serve their interests.29
Physician-investigators at academic medical centers are also subject to conflicts of interest that may affect recruitment and enrollment decisions. Physicians in academia face institutional pressure to secure research funding to support their salaries, and their salaries may
vary depending upon the amount of funding they obtain. They also have other incentives to
conduct research, including publication of the results in the medical literature, a requirement
for tenure and promotion.30
Civil lawsuits, government investigations and prosecutions, and news investigations have
shed light on conflicts of interest that may have adversely affected recruitment and enrollment
or the actual conduct of clinical trials, and, more tragically, possibly placed participants at serious risk of harm. In one well-known case, 18-year old Jesse Gelsinger died while participating
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in a Phase I gene therapy trial.31 Jesse Gelsinger’s father sued the researchers, the hospitals that
employed the researchers, the university that approved and sponsored the trial and employed a
bench scientist involved with the trial, and a bioethicist who consulted on the trial’s design.32
Among other claims, Jesse’s father asserted that the researchers committed fraud, based in
part on the fact that neither the researchers nor the informed consent document told Jesse or
his father that the study’s co-principal investigators and the university institute conducting the
research had a substantial equity stake in the vector used in the clinical trial.33
In 2006, Katrina McKenzie, a participant in a clinical trial of ceramic-on-ceramic hip
implants, brought a suit against her surgeon and the hospital where the implant surgery occurred.34 The implants in both of McKenzie’s hips failed, requiring her to undergo additional
surgeries. McKenzie’s surgeon testified in a deposition that he received no direct financial
benefit from the implant trial because the payments from the device maker which sponsored
the trial went to the academic medical center which employed him. McKenzie’s surgeon conceded, however, that the trial sponsor did pay him between $20,000 and $50,000 a year for
consulting work – income that he had not disclosed to McKenzie. In an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, McKenzie’s lawyer asserted that the surgeon had a conflict of interest which may
have influenced his decision to use the experimental hip implants in McKenzie’s case. McKenzie’s surgeon denied any negligence. The case settled in August 2008 on the eve of trial.35
A 1999 New York Times investigation highlighted the case of Thomas Parham, who
enrolled in a clinical trial of a prostate drug at his doctor’s encouragement.36 Parham had previously been hospitalized for a chronic slow heart rate, and the clinical trial’s protocol specifically excluded patients with that condition from participating in the study. Parham’s physician
did not inform Parham that the physician was paid $1,610 for each patient enrolled, an amount
that covered study expenses and allowed for a profit for the physician and his associates. Parham’s physician informed the drug company sponsoring the trial about Parham’s slow heart
rate but failed to tell the company about his prior hospitalization. Soon after joining the study,
Parham complained of fatigue, a symptom of a slow heart rate, but his doctor dismissed his
complaints. Within weeks Parham was hospitalized and given a pacemaker.37
Pharmaceutical companies have also faced government investigation and civil litigation
for conducting so-called “seeding studies” designed primarily to market a product to physicians but presented as research to the physicians and the patients they recruit – a practice
that stands to undermine the research enterprise as a whole. One such study enrolled 5,557
individuals in a head to head clinical trial of Vioxx and naproxen, with the stated purpose of
evaluating Vioxx’s gastrointestinal tolerability.38 In fact, a review of company documents
made public as a result of litigation revealed that the manufacturer’s marketing department designed the study to expose unwitting primary care physicians recruited as study investigators
to Vioxx in the months before and after its launch.39 An internal memorandum explained that
the trial design focused on demonstrating the advantages of Vioxx to primary care physicians
because they were important prescribers.40 The patients who participated were not told of the
trial’s marketing aims, undermining the validity of their consent.41
Recently, in another example of “research” misconduct, a government investigation into
clinical research at Walter Reed Army Medical Center revealed that a principal investigator
who had systematically falsified research findings had been paid thousands of dollars for consulting work by the corporation that produced the bone growth product under study.42 The
researcher’s subsequent research at Washington University was suspended when the school
learned of the physician’s undisclosed conflicts of interest.
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The problems represented by these anecdotal cases require a more pervasive public policy response than can be accomplished through private litigation, prosecutions, and newspaper
reports. At present, however, the government provides little guidance or oversight of compensation for clinical research, or other conflicts that arise from the financial relationships between industry and investigators and institutions. Federal regulations and guidance statements
assign to institutional review boards (IRBs) full responsibility to conduct an ethics review
of clinical trials involving human subjects, including proposed recruitment and enrollment
practices. Yet IRBs have not traditionally been charged to identify and manage conflicts of
interest. Rather, government agencies and professional organizations such as the Association
of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Association of American Universities (AAU)
recommend that academic medical centers establish standing conflict of interest committees to
review and manage conflicts of interest.43 These recommendations, however, are not binding
on academic medical centers or other institutions.
Institutions that receive federal government funding for medical research, primarily
medical schools and affiliated hospitals, must establish conflict of interest policies, identify
the financial interests of investigators, determine if they constitute a conflict of interest, and
if they do, decide how to manage or minimize the conflict.44 Even where required, conflict
of interest policies and practices vary substantially from institution to institution. Moreover,
recent research focused on academic medical centers has revealed that institutional practices
diverge with some frequency from written policies.45 Most community hospitals do not have
conflict of interest committees. Rather, the institutions’ IRBs are often tasked with reviewing
investigators’ financial relationships, although it can be difficult for them to gain information
about such relationships or disapprove of protocols where a conflict of interest exists.46
Beyond the hospital setting, neither physician offices nor many other organizations in
the community that conduct research have IRBs. Consequently, as research has extended
beyond the walls of the academic medical center, a system of independent (for-profit) IRBs
has developed to facilitate these institutions’ compliance with federal review requirements.47
These independent IRBs review and approve the recruitment and enrollment plan as well as
the ethical issues posed by the proposed study to protect the interests of participants and affirm the scientific integrity of the research.48 Physicians and private research institutes are not
required to provide information to the independent IRB about incentives paid to physicians or
others to recruit and enroll patients, overall compensation for the clinical trial, or other relevant
financial interests held by the investigator or entity. To the contrary, this information is often
considered proprietary, and is therefore frequently not provided to the IRBs charged to evaluate and approve the research protocol.
In sum, while the landscape of clinical research has changed dramatically – the number
of trials has increased and research is now largely funded by industry and conducted outside of
the academic purview – federal policy on recruitment and enrollment, and conflicts of interest
in research more generally, has not changed substantially. Given the mounting pressures to
recruit and enroll patients and the current lack of government oversight, policy and practice regarding conflicts of interest in clinical research recruitment and enrollment cry out for reform.
Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy held a forum on
March 23, 2009 to examine current policy and practice and devise recommendations for
change. This White Paper focuses on the need for policy and institutional reform to protect
potential research participants and the integrity of research in the recruitment and enrollment
process.
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CURRENT PRACTICES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH
The drug, device, and biotechnology industries currently fund the majority of clinical
trials across a range of settings including academic medical centers, community hospitals,
physician practices, and research centers and institutes. The government also funds extramural research, primarily in the academic setting. Conflicts of interest can arise for investigators
and institutions due to the compensation methodologies for research as well as the broad array
of other financial relationships between industry and physicians or their employers.

A.

Definition of Conflict of Interest

In its recent report, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice,
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined “conflict of interest” as “a set of circumstances that
creates a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.”49 Physician-investigators in clinical research have
several primary obligations: i) promoting and protecting the scientific integrity of the research;
ii) protecting the well-being of participants; and iii) contributing to scientific advances.50 In
addition, investigators may have a host of secondary interests motivating their participation in
research, such as earning the respect of colleagues, supplementing their income, or advancing
their career. Importantly, there is nothing inherently wrong with these secondary influences.
The term “conflict of interest” does not equate to compromised judgment or action but to the
risk of such compromise.
This White Paper focuses on secondary interests that are financial in nature. As explained by the IOM in its report, financial interests may be no more likely to unduly influence
an investigator than other secondary interests but, because they are more easily measured, they
can be managed through broad-based reform of policy and practice.

B.

Compensation for Research
1. Per-Capita Payments

Under the most common compensation arrangement, the sponsoring company pays
investigators or the institutions that employ them a fixed amount per research participant
enrolled.51 This amount can encompass payment for clinical procedures, physician time, facility use, laboratory costs, pharmacy fees, research coordinator or nurse salaries, and overhead
costs.52 Also covered are the time spent and costs incurred on nontreatment trial activities
such as participant recruitment, the informed consent process, randomization of study medication, adverse events reporting, data management and analysis, audits and communications
with the sponsor, and post study follow-up and meetings.53 A study estimating the clinical and
nonclinical hours and costs associated with conducting a Phase III oncology trial concluded
that the time spent on nontreatment activities was “considerable, and the associated costs are
substantial.”54 Typically, sponsors have schedules of standard fees for the procedures required
by clinical trial protocols; investigators and their institutions have their own schedules, and the
two parties negotiate the payment for the trial.55
Under legal standards set by federal and state laws barring remuneration for referring
patients into treatment, compensation for treatment or services paid for by government must
not exceed “fair market value.”56 These rules were not developed with clinical research in
mind. Nonetheless, they underlie federal law on research compensation; the concept of fair
market value drives both industry analysis and enforcement oversight.
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Because federal law provides little guidance about how reasonable or fair market value
compensation should be determined, or even how to define what the “market” is, companies
and the consultants upon whom they rely have developed their own methodologies. A range
of methods to set compensation for clinical research has emerged, including: (i) a company’s
own past practice; (ii) compensation surveys; (iii) the use of independent third parties to conduct fair market value assessments; (iv) benchmarks such as the Medicare reimbursement rate
for a given procedure; and (v) a combination of these methods or other methods altogether.57
Inconsistencies abound.
While per capita payments are relatively uncontroversial within industry and the medical profession, they are not unproblematic. Whenever a physician-investigator is paid more
for conducting research than for treating patients, he or she has a financial incentive to enroll
patients in research, and a potential conflict of interest arises.58 Further, some evidence suggests that industry pays physician-investigators more for their services than the government
or private insurance companies. A 2002 article in JAMA reported that manufacturers offered
investigators two to five times the compensation paid by NIH, and that manufacturers paid
fees several-fold greater than those of Medicare or third-party carriers.59 A Kaiser Permanente
health care economist makes a similar claim, stating that study sponsors frequently pay topof-the-market rates that serve as a source of profit for research sites.60 Other experts contest
these claims, pointing to evidence that payments for clinical research have remained stagnant
as clinical trial protocols have grown increasingly complex, leading to a decline in the number
of physicians willing to undertake clinical research.61

2. Global Payments
The government typically pays research institutions a “global payment” to compensate
them for all work on a clinical trial protocol as well as overhead costs. The institution budgets for the work of the investigator and other of its employees by multiplying the percentage
of time employees will spend on the project by their respective salaries. While the institution factors into the global payment the number of participants it anticipates will need to be
recruited to conduct the trial, there is no one-to-one correlation between the number of patients
enrolled and the amount of the payment.
Drug, device, and biotechnology companies do not typically use global payments,
although they do compensate investigators or their institutions for certain fixed expenses
which can include a startup fee for work conducted in advance of enrollment. A review of
over 237,000 industry-investigator contracts worldwide revealed that over half of the contracts
for clinical research in the United States included a startup fee to cover expenses for activities
such as agreement processing, protocol review, and preparing the IRB submission.62 Paying
for expenses such as these separately rather than folding them into a per capita fee makes the
budgeting process and clinical trial agreement more transparent. This approach could also
reduce the conflict of interest caused by high per capita payments. In addition, it allows for
reimbursement of recruitment expenses to investigators even when they do not succeed in
actually enrolling participants into the trial. Reimbursement for this legitimate cost of research
may reduce the incentive to enroll unqualified candidates to cover expenses.

3. Payment in the Form of Equity in the Sponsor
Some trial sponsors remunerate investigators with company stock or stock options.
According to New Jersey’s Attorney General, compensation with stock for clinical research
is a “widespread industry practice.”63 Compensation with equity in the sponsor creates a
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conflict of interest for physician-investigators because it gives them a stake in the outcome
of the research. If the data from the trial are positive, it will boost the sponsor’s bottom line,
which will in turn increase the investigator’s gain through increased stock value and the potential for higher dividend payments.
Remunerating researchers with sponsor stock has been sharply criticized. In a press
release announcing the 2009 settlement with device maker Synthes, New Jersey’s Attorney
General asserted that payment with stock or stock options is “outrageous” and “unacceptable.”64 The settlement bans compensation of investigators and research institutions with Synthes stock or stock options.65 In its “Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials,” PhRMA, the
trade organization which represents pharmaceutical and some biotechnology companies, also
states that companies should not compensate investigators with stock or stock options.66 In
contrast, the Code of Ethics on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals promulgated by
AdvaMed, the trade group which represents medical device companies, appears to permit all
forms of compensation as long as they do not constitute a kickback under federal law.67

4. Recruitment and Retention Bonuses
In some trials, payment by industry sponsors also includes bonuses for attaining enumerated recruitment and retention goals.68 Bonuses can be paid for securing IRB approval
in a timely fashion or for meeting enrollment deadlines. In some instances, companies pay
investigators bonuses for exceeding enrollment targets or when research participants complete
the study or study milestones. Recruitment incentives can also take the form of a bonus or
increase in the per-participant payment after a specified number of participants have been enrolled. Finally, companies may establish a structure in which research sites compete with one
another to recruit a sufficient number of participants; those that meet the quota may be allowed
to recruit additional participants while those that do not may be dropped from the study.69
A 2003 survey study revealed that 74% of research sites were compensated by one or more
“competitive enrollment practices”; 78% of these sites received bonuses for on-time participant
enrollment and 68% received additional bonuses for over-enrollment.70
These bonus payments could influence investigators’ decisions about prospective participants’ initial or continuing eligibility, thereby potentially placing enrollees at risk or undermining the scientific integrity of the study. In a report on clinical research involving children, the IOM opined that recruitment bonuses are unethical and should be prohibited.71 The
PhRMA Clinical Trials Principles do not explicitly prohibit recruitment bonuses but implicitly
discourage them, providing that in cases where enrollment is challenging, payments can be
made to compensate for the additional time and effort the investigator or institution must expend on recruitment.72 In addition, some companies, such as Pfizer, have adopted policies that
explicitly prohibit all incentives “designed to reward the achievement of subject enrollment
goals within a specified time frame.”73

5. Finder’s Fees
A sponsor may also offer a so-called “finder’s fee,” a payment made to individuals other
than the investigator, including other physicians, nurses, medical students, or participants in
the clinical trial, for identifying and referring potential study participants.74 Definitions of
finder’s fees vary. As used here, finder’s fee refers to payments solely for referrals, not payment for services provided at fair market value as part of the recruitment process, such as the
time and effort involved in screening prospective participants to determine if they are suitable
candidates or explaining the study to them.75
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Professional organizations including the American College of Physicians and the
American Medical Association (AMA) have rejected the use of finder’s fees as unethical.76
Many academic medical centers prohibit or sharply limit their use;77 some pharmaceutical
companies refuse to pay such fees as well.78 Moreover, finder’s fees may constitute a kickback
under federal and state laws.79 Still, a recent study suggests that finder’s fees may be common. A 2006 survey of 300 clinical research coordinators in academic medicine, community hospitals, physician-based practices, stand-alone research centers, and elsewhere revealed
that nearly a third (32.1%) of the coordinators had worked on studies in which finder’s fees
were paid.80

6. Salary
Compensation of physician-investigators in the form of a salary does not in itself
create a financial conflict of interest with the potential to affect recruitment and enrollment.
Some physicians are employees, for example, of academic medical centers or private physician
practices, and draw a salary that may or may not be related to productivity goals. Of course,
the absence of a direct financial incentive to enroll research participants does not mean that
salaried investigators are without conflicts. Their job security, eligibility for tenure and promotion, and ability to secure government grants and other funding in the future may all depend
on their ability to enroll enough participants to conduct research and publish the findings.

7. Other Financial Ties between Industry and Investigators and Institutions
In addition to the compensation they receive for conducting clinical trials, investigators may have an array of other financial ties to drug, device, and biotechnology companies.81
Industry pays physicians for a broad range of activities, including service on marketing and
medical advisory boards, consulting work, and promotional speaking. Traditionally, sales
representatives have plied doctors with gifts, meals, and other perks, but these are gradually
disappearing. One large national survey of physicians in six specialties found that 94% of
physicians reported some type of financial relationship with industry, ranging from receipt of
food in the work place (83%) and drug samples (78%) to payments for lectures, consulting,
and clinical trial work (28%).82 An earlier study found that 43% of scientists in the 50 most
research-intensive universities received research-related gifts from industry such as biomaterials or research equipment, trips to professional meetings, and discretionary funds.83 Physicians also participate in the development of new drugs and devices and may own intellectual
property as a result, including patents, licenses, and royalty rights.84 In addition, physicians
may own stock or other equity in drug and device companies, including companies they have
founded to commercialize their research findings, and may serve on company boards of directors or as officers.
Like investigators, research institutions can have financial ties to industry that give rise
to conflicts of interest. The AAMC defines an institutional conflict of interest as a situation
in which “the financial interests of the institution, or of an institutional official acting within
his or her authority on behalf of the institution, might affect – or reasonably appear to affect
– institutional processes for the conduct, review, or oversight of human subjects research.”85
Examples of institutional relationships with industry include investments by the institution or
its high-level officials in drug, device, or biotechnology companies, industry donations to support endowed professorships or new construction, and industry grants for continuing medical
education programs. Relationships such as these are not rare. A survey of medical schools
and teaching hospitals revealed that 60% of department chairs had financial relationships with
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industry and 67% of departments had received industry support, including receipt of research
equipment, funding for continuing medical education or resident and fellowship training, and
unrestricted funds.86 As one notable example, in 2005 the Wall Street Journal reported that the
Cleveland Clinic had established and invested in a venture capital fund which had a 4.1% stake,
valued at about $7 million, in AtriCure, a startup company that manufactured a device used
off-label in heart surgery.87 The chief executive officer of the Clinic sat on AtriCure’s Board of
Directors and invested in and helped manage the venture capital fund. At the time of the news
reports, researchers at the Cleveland Clinic were conducting clinical trials of the AtriCure device; they also endorsed its use in heart surgery at conferences and in journal articles.
Some financial ties pose more risk of unduly influencing recruitment and enrollment
practices than others. For example, the IOM has recommended that investigators with a “significant financial interest in an existing or potential product or a company that could be affected by the outcome” of a clinical trial not be permitted to conduct the research unless their
participation is justified by compelling circumstances and is effectively managed by the institution, while PhRMA’s Clinical Trials Principles provide that “[c]linical investigators or their
immediate family should not have a direct ownership interest in the specific pharmaceutical
product being studied.”88 These recommendations reflect a judgment that when investigators
have a financial interest in the outcome of a trial it generates an unacceptable risk that their
financial holdings may influence decisions about recruitment and enrollment, participant safety, data integrity, and other aspects of the research. The AAMC has opined similarly with
regard to institutional conflicts of interest, setting forth a list of financial relationships between
industry and institutions which create a rebuttable presumption against conducting research at
or under the auspices of the institution.89

C.

Institutional Oversight of Payment Practices and Other
Conflicts of Interest
1. Academic Medicine

In successive reports issued in 2001 and 2002, the AAMC recommended that academic medical centers adopt practices to manage individual and institutional conflicts of interest, including the creation of a conflicts of interest committee to gather information about
significant financial interests in research, identify those that are conflicts, and determine steps
to minimize or eliminate the conflict.90 The AAMC also recommended that conflicts committees appoint a liaison to the IRB and that they report their findings to the IRB before the IRB
approves the research in question so that the conflicts committee’s determinations can inform
the IRB’s review of the research protocol.91 Notably, the AAMC’s definition of “significant
financial interests in research” excludes “[p]ayments to the institution, or via the institution to
the individual, that are directly related to reasonable costs incurred in the conduct of research
as specified in the research agreement(s) between the sponsor and the institution.”92 No provision is made for review of such payments.
Few question that IRBs should receive information about researchers’ conflicts and the
conflicts committee’s proposed resolution of those conflicts.93 However, disagreement exists
about how to resolve contrary recommendations emerging from the IRB and conflicts committees.94 There is also disagreement about whether IRBs should manage conflicts in the first
instance, rather than establishing a separate conflicts committee.95 Currently, IRBs are not
directly charged with conflict review and management and may lack the necessary expertise, time, and resources. A recent survey of IRB members and chairs in academic medicine
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revealed that two-thirds believed that IRBs should weigh investigators’ relationships with
industry as part of the IRBs’ review of the research protocol, regardless of whether the
conflicts committee deemed the relationship a conflict of interest.96 Less than half of those
surveyed reported that their IRB always reviewed industry relationships, however. Reasons
for not conducting a review included “that the topic didn’t come up (41.8%), they didn’t feel it
was the IRB’s responsibility (20.0%), it was difficult to obtain the information (19.7%), or the
IRB lacked the expertise to make an informed decision (11.6%).”97 Notably, IRBs have had
only limited success managing their own members’ conflicts of interest.98
In a 2008 report evaluating the progress made by academic medical centers in
implementing the AAMC and AAU conflicts management proposals, a joint AAMC and AAU
advisory committee concluded that institutions took the proposals seriously, especially those
addressing individual conflicts, and attempted to implement them, but had fallen short.99 A
2004 AAMC survey revealed that over three quarters of the responding medical schools had
created standing conflicts committees but that over a third had failed to establish a rebuttable
presumption against participation in research by researchers with a financial stake in the outcome.100 In addition, only a low fraction of the respondents reported that the conflicts committee had completed its work prior to the IRB’s review and approval of the study at issue.101
Academic medical centers have found managing institutional conflicts to be even more
challenging than managing individual conflicts. Recently published survey data indicates that
only 30 of 125 responding medical centers had an institutional conflict of interest policy and
that only 25 institutions reported institutional conflicts to the IRB charged with conducting an
ethics review of proposed clinical trials.102 Anecdotal evidence also supports the conclusion
that institutional oversight of both individual and institutional conflicts of interest is uneven.
Congressional investigations have revealed that several prominent investigators at academic
medical centers failed to report their industry relationships to their universities.103

2. Research in Physician Practices, Community Hospitals, and Independent
Research Institutes
Even less oversight of conflicts of interest exists outside of academic medicine. Conflicts
committees are rare or nonexistent. Some IRBs review physician-investigator’s financial relationships with the study sponsor, including compensation to the physician-investigator, but
some do not.104
FDA regulations require investigators to provide the sponsoring company with information about their financial interests; sponsors must collect the information and ensure that
conflicts are managed to protect the integrity of the data collected.105 Sponsoring companies
may delegate this (and other) responsibilities to subcontractors called clinical or contract research organizations (CROs).106 There are also subcontractors that assume investigators’ duties, called site management organizations (SMOs); unlike CROs, they are not specifically
authorized by regulation. Unless and until the clinical trial results are submitted to the FDA
as part of a marketing application, there is little or no review or oversight of conflicts reporting
and management by investigators, SMOs, sponsors, and CROs.
When research is conducted outside of academic medicine, the federally-mandated ethics
review is most typically performed by an independent IRB.107 Independent IRBs are for-profit
companies unaffiliated with industry sponsors or CROs. They are widely believed to be more
efficient than academic medical centers’ IRBs, but the quality and objectivity of independent
IRBs varies; investigators, SMOs, sponsors, or CROs retain the IRB and have discretion as to
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which IRB they choose to hire for each protocol reviewed.108 IRB accreditation exists but it is
voluntary and only a handful of independent IRBs are accredited.109
Research conducted outside of academic medicine but within general acute care or community hospitals may be reviewed by an in-house IRB, which may also assume jurisdiction
over conflicts of interest. A recent study of such hospitals found that 90% had policies and procedures in place requiring IRB review of the financial relationships between physician-investigators and research sponsors.110 However, the study also reported that most of the hospitals
that reviewed per capita payments rarely rejected a research proposal for excessive payments
due to the difficulty they faced in assessing reasonable or fair market value for the payments to
investigators.111 The study also found that many physicians who practice in community hospitals are not typically paid by the hospital and may be reluctant to divulge their personal financial information to the hospitals’ IRBs. This problem also arises when research is conducted in
physician offices and group practices; community-based physician-investigators are under no
obligation to disclose their financial information to the independent IRB reviewing the study.

3. Self-Regulation by Investigators
The Public Health Service (PHS) requires that institutions inform investigators about its
conflict of interest regulations, the institution’s conflict of interest policy, and the investigator’s
reporting responsibilities.112 The FDA’s regulations lack a comparable requirement, requiring
only that investigators provide study sponsors with accurate, updated financial information
(including any financial arrangements between the sponsor and the clinical investigator, significant payments of other sorts from the sponsor of the covered study, proprietary interests
in the tested product, and significant equity interest in the sponsor).113 The AAMC’s 2004
study on implementation of its conflict of interest recommendations revealed that just half of
the responding schools provided training on conflicts of interest.114 The lack of training for
investigators is problematic because studies show that many physicians do not appreciate the
risks posed by conflicts of interest, believing that industry compensation relationships might
unduly influence their colleagues but not themselves.115
Physicians are not of one mind about whether conflicts of interest adversely affect their
judgment. This ambivalence is reflected in the recent vote by the AMA to reject a proposal that
the organization advise its members that it was ethically preferable for continuing medical education not to be funded by industry.116 A chartering of a new advocacy organization, the Association for Clinical Researchers and Educators (ACRE), which seeks to advance collaboration
with industry and its counterparts, further evidences the profession’s divide.117 ACRE decries
“restrictive conflict of interest policies that often sever productive relationships between industry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.”118 Physicians
in the community may be even less prepared than investigators in academic medicine to identify and address their own conflicts of interest. Like their counterparts in academic medicine,
they do not receive training in conflicts of interest. Moreover, community physicians are less
likely to have the knowledge and experience to conduct an independent review of the scientific
merits of the trial protocol or of the ethical issues it might pose.119 Often, they regard ethical
issues that arise as the sponsor’s responsibility and may have a poor understanding of how decisions they make in the recruitment and enrollment process could affect participants’ interests
and the integrity of the study findings.120
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GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT
A.

Federal Law and Guidance

In 2000, the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that oversight of recruitment
– both by the federal government and by local IRBs – was “minimal and largely unresponsive
to emerging concerns.”121 Despite these findings, the regulation of recruitment and enrollment
in clinical trials has still not changed significantly.122 The concerns to which the OIG referred
included pressure to recruit participants quickly, which could potentially undermine the informed consent process and lead to the enrollment of ineligible subjects. These concerns are
even more compelling today.
Federal conflict of interest regulations govern most research conducted at academic
medical centers as well as research in all settings involving drugs and devices that will be
submitted to FDA for marketing approval. The PHS’s conflicts of interest regulations govern
institutions that apply for research funding from PHS agencies, including the NIH, as well as
the investigators participating in the research.123 The FDA regulations cover clinical studies submitted in marketing applications for new drugs and biological products and marketing
applications and reclassification petitions for medical devices.124 However, these regulations
do not provide for oversight of all relationships between industry and research institutions
and investigators.125 Moreover, even where FDA and PHS regulations do apply, they provide
little guidance for investigators and industry regarding appropriate financial arrangements for
clinical research. States’ oversight of research on human subjects has been insufficient, and
few, if any, states have distinct requirements for managing relationships between industry and
investigators.126

1. PHS Regulations
PHS has issued conflicts of interest regulations that govern academic medical centers
and other institutions that seek NIH and other federal government grants.127 Under these regulations, grant-seeking institutions must require their investigators to disclose to the institutions
“significant financial interests” “that would reasonably appear to be affected by the research
for which PHS funding is sought” as well as significant financial interests “[i]n entities whose
financial interests would reasonably appear to be affected by the research.”128 These disclosures by investigators must be made annually, and updated when the institution applies for a
grant and whenever the investigator incurs a new significant financial interest.129
Significant financial interests include salary, royalties, or other payments (such as consulting or speaking fees) to the investigator or the investigator’s spouse or dependent children in excess of $10,000 and equity interests owned by the investigator or the investigator’s
spouse or dependent children in excess of $10,000, or 5% of any single entity.130 Institutions
are required to take steps to manage, reduce, or eliminate any conflict of interest posed by a
significant financial interest and report to NIH or other agency that they have done so.131 The
regulations do not require that institutions report the nature of a conflict of interest or other
details in the first instance, but they must be prepared to provide the funding agency with such
additional information upon request.132
The PHS regulations list a number of mechanisms to manage conflicts, including
monitoring by independent reviewers, modification of the research plan, disqualification from
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participation in all or portion of the research, divestiture of significant financial interests,
severance of relationships that create actual or potential conflicts, and public disclosure of
significant financial interests.133 Notably, these requirements for identifying and managing
conflicts apply only to investigator conflicts of interest. No regulations currently govern
institutional conflicts of interest.
On May 8, 2009, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking comment on
possible amendments to these conflict of interest regulations.134 The nature and scope of the
questions posed signal the potential for significant changes in current oversight of conflicts
of interest. HHS sought comments related to both the obligations assigned to institutions as
well as the role of government agencies in overseeing conflicts of interest.135 In addition, HHS
asked for feedback on various proposals to incorporate institutional conflicts of interest into
the regulatory scheme, to enhance the identification and management of investigator conflicts
by institutions, and to assure institutional compliance.

2. HHS Guidance Statement
In 2004, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a guidance statement on
“Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects: Guidance for
Human Subject Protection” (the “Guidance Statement”).136 The Guidance Statement is nonbinding, and sets forth questions for IRBs, institutions, and investigators engaged in research
to consider when determining: (i) whether specific financial relationships create financial
interests that may adversely affect the rights and welfare of subjects, and (ii) how potential or
actual financial conflicts of interest should be managed or eliminated.
More specifically, the Guidance Statement recommends that the IRBs, institutions,
and investigators consider which procedures would be helpful in identifying and managing
financial conflicts of interest for institutions and investigators, such as: i) collecting and evaluating information regarding financial relationships related to research; ii) determining whether
those relationships potentially cause a conflict of interest; and iii) determining the actions
necessary to protect human subjects and ensure that those actions are taken. The Guidance
Statement suggests that the IRB, institution, or investigator identify the entity to examine
individual and/or institutional financial relationships and interests, although it does not go as
far as to recommend which entity should conduct the examination. It also calls for consideration of who should be educated regarding financial conflict of interest issues and policies.
Regarding institutional oversight specifically, the Guidance Statement suggests that institutions consider, among other things: i) “[e]stablishing the independence of institutional
responsibility for research activities from the management of the institution’s financial interests”; ii) “[e]stablishing conflict of interest committees (COICs) or identifying other bodies or
persons and procedures” to manage or eliminate financial conflicts of interest; iii) “[e]stablishing clear channels of communication between COICs and IRBs”; iv) “[i]ncluding individuals
from outside the institution in the review and oversight of financial interests in research”;
and v) “[e]stablishing policies regarding the types of financial relationships that may be held
by parties involved in the research and circumstances under which those financial relationships and interests may or may not be held.”137 The Guidance Statement also has specific
recommendations for investigators in clinical research, instructing that they consider, among
other things, “the kind, amount, and level of detail of information to be provided to research
subjects regarding the source of funding, funding arrangements, financial interests of parties
involved in the research, and any financial interest management techniques applied.”138
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3. FDA Regulations
Clinical trials of drugs and medical devices are regulated by the FDA, which has adopted
a conflict of interest policy to require that steps are “taken in the design, conduct, reporting,
and analysis of [clinical trials] to minimize bias.”139 The FDA obligates sponsors that submit
marketing applications for drugs and devices to provide a list of the investigators who worked
on “covered clinical stud[ies],” their financial interests as defined by the FDA, and the financial
interests of their spouses and dependent children.140 Covered studies are those that the study
sponsor or the “FDA relies on to establish that the product is effective… or any study in which
a single investigator makes a significant contribution to the demonstration of safety.”141 FDA
conflict of interest oversight would not in general extend to “phase 1 tolerance studies or pharmacokinetic studies, most clinical pharmacology studies (unless they are critical to an efficacy
determination), large open safety studies conducted at multiple sites, treatment protocols, and
parallel track protocols,” or to post-approval trials that are not submitted in support of a supplemental marketing application.142
As a general rule, the purpose of FDA’s oversight of financial interests is data integrity,
not the protection of research participants.143 The FDA requires submission of conflict of
interest information only for the subset of studies about which it has the most data integrity
concerns, primarily those used to establish a product’s efficacy, and only after the studies are
complete.
For investigators conducting covered clinical studies, the FDA regulations require sponsors to disclose to the FDA the following financial interests: (1) compensation that could be
influenced by the outcome of the clinical trial; (2) “significant payments of other sorts,” such as
consulting or speaking fees, in excess of $25,000 from the sponsor to the investigator; (3) any
proprietary interest, such as a patent or trademark, in the tested product; and (4) any “significant equity interest” in the sponsor, defined to include equity in publicly-traded corporations
in excess of $50,000 and equity in other entities that are not readily valued by reference to
public prices.144 Notably, payments to cover “the costs of conducting the clinical study or other
clinical studies” are expressly excluded from the definition of “significant payments of other
sorts.”145 In addition to disclosing information about financial ties, the FDA requires research
sponsors to report on steps taken to minimize the potential for bias.146 If an investigator’s
disclosure raises data integrity questions, the FDA may audit the investigator’s data, require
further analyses or studies, or refuse to use the entire clinical trial.147

4. Anti-Kickback Law
The federal Anti-Kickback law148 also has implications for the financial relationships
of clinical investigators and manufacturers. The Anti-Kickback law prohibits remuneration
in exchange for patient referrals to health services covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other
federally-funded programs. Specifically, the law bars any payment by an entity or individual to
a physician for the purpose of inducing the physician to prescribe or use health care services reimbursed by a federal health program, including drugs and devices.149 The federal government
and several courts have held that even if only one purpose of a payment is to induce referrals,
the transaction violates the law.150 The Anti-Kickback law is a felony criminal statute which
provides for criminal fines of up to $25,000 and prison terms of up to 5 years for each violation. A separate statute provides for civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 per violation.151
Violators of the Anti-Kickback law also risk exclusion from participation in federal health
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.152 In addition, they could be sued by the govern-
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ment or by a relator (an individual acting on the government’s behalf) under the civil False
Claims Act (FCA), on the theory that “a claim induced by a kickback is a fraudulent claim.”153
The FCA provides for treble damages.154 As demonstrated by prominent prosecutions and
settlements, financial arrangements between physicians and industry can violate the Anti-Kickback law, including payments to physicians who serve as consultants, members of scientific
advisory boards, or company speakers who are also prescribers of the company’s products.155
Congress and the OIG have designated “safe harbors” for payment and business practices that, while potentially prohibited by the Anti-Kickback law, will not be prosecuted if every
element of the safe harbor is met.156 Failure to fulfill each safe harbor element does not mean
that an activity is illegal – it means that an entity does not receive the benefit of the promise
of non-prosecution. If an activity falls outside the safe harbor, the regulator or enforcement
agency will employ its discretion to determine whether a statutory violation exists.157
Recognizing that none of the safe harbors apply to clinical research, government regulators have advised sponsors to hew as closely as possible to the law’s “personal services” safe
harbor to avoid prosecution.158 The personal services safe harbor requires that a contract for
professional services for a clinical trial must: (i) be in writing and signed by both parties; (ii)
specify all of the services the physician is to provide, each of which must be “reasonably necessary to accomplish the [agreement’s] commercially reasonable business purpose”; (iii) specify
the precise amount of time the physician will spend and the precise amount to be paid for his
or her time; (iv) last for at least a year; (v) provide for compensation that is “consistent with
fair market value in arms-length transactions”; and (vi) not “take[] into account the volume or
value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.”159 The requirement that the agreement specify the payment amount raises particular issues for clinical
research, which frequently relies upon per capita or per enrollee payments. With a per capita
payment arrangement, it is difficult to set the global compensation in advance; while a trial
likely has certain goals for the number of patients recruited, those goals may not be reached or
may be exceeded. Post-approval clinical trials, where the sponsor does not provide the study
medication for free, could also fail to meet the safe harbor requirement that the amount the
physician is paid be unrelated to the volume or value of business generated between the parties.160 While per capita payments are common practice, they must be structured carefully to
meet the other prongs of the safe harbor.161
The OIG has also made clear that research contracts influenced by sales and marketing
personnel are “particularly suspect.”162 The OIG has focused on post-FDA approval “studies,”
suggesting that some are shams undertaken to induce physicians to use or prescribe the company’s drugs or devices, thereby violating the Anti-Kickback law.163 The OIG’s 2003 Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers instructs that to “reduce risk,
manufacturers should insulate research grant making from sales and marketing influences.”164
It is critical that a study design have valid scientific goals and merit, rather than seek to achieve
promotional purposes.165

5. Federal Guidance on Setting Fair Market Value
One linchpin of compliance with the Anti-Kickback law is compensation at fair market
value (FMV).166 Although the OIG has issued Advisory Opinions167 addressing the application of the Anti-Kickback law to physician compensation in contexts other than research, such
as compensation paid by a hospital to a physician to be on-call, none contains detailed direction on calculating the fair market value of a physician-investigator’s research services, which
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comprise both administrative and clinical tasks. Companies have been cautioned not to rely on
values that may encompass a bias to overcompensation.168 As applied to clinical research, this
suggests that data on payment to physician-investigators for conducting clinical trials must be
scrutinized to assure that the payments do not reflect physicians’ ability to generate business,
either because they themselves are high prescribers or because they can affect the prescription
practices of others.
The Stark Law prohibiting physicians from referring patients to ancillary services in
which the referring physician or a family member has a financial relationship169 and the federal
law precluding tax-exempt organizations from providing an excess benefit to individuals in a
position to influence the organization’s decisions170 also rely upon the concept of fair market
value or reasonable compensation as a touchstone for compliance. While these laws provide
additional models of FMV, like the Anti-Kickback law, they do not establish a specific framework or guidance on setting FMV for clinical research.
The Stark Law defines the fair market value of, among other things, a physician’s personal services as “the value in arms length transactions, consistent with the general market
value.”171 The regulations promulgated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) on exceptions to the general rule against physician self-referral elaborate on the definition, providing,
“general market value” means… the compensation that would be included in a
service agreement as the result of bona fide bargaining between well-informed
parties to the agreement who are not otherwise in a position to generate business
for the other party… Usually, the fair market price is… the compensation that has
been included in bona fide service agreements with comparable terms at the time
of the agreement, where the price or compensation has not been determined in
any manner that takes into account the volume or value of anticipated or actual
referrals.172
Repealing earlier regulations that had sought to provide “bright line” rules for physician
compensation,173 CMS advised in the Federal Register that fair market value determinations
are ultimately subject to a facts and circumstances test, and that “[r]eference to multiple, objective, independently published salary surveys remains a prudent practice for evaluating fair
market value;” it emphasized that any “commercially reasonable methodology” could be used,
and that the appropriate methodology depends, inter alia, upon the nature of the transaction
and location.174 CMS also noted that the fair market value of a physician’s services as an administrator could differ from the fair market value of his or her clinical services.175 Notably, in
the clinical trials context, physician-investigators often engage in both types of services.176
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations on “reasonable compensation” for an individual who has “substantial influence” over a tax-exempt entity also incorporate the concept
of fair market value and are therefore another potential source of guidance by analogy. The
IRS regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that the compensation paid by a tax-exempt
organization is reasonable (and therefore does not jeopardize the organization’s tax exempt
status or subject the individuals involved in the transaction to potential sanctions) if it is: (1)
approved by a committee of individuals who do not themselves have a conflict of interest; (2)
based on data regarding compensation of comparable individuals employed by comparable
organizations; and (3) adequately documented.177 The IRS has also issued guidance on valuing businesses, which some commentators have argued can be applied to setting physician
compensation.178
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Neither AdvaMed nor PhRMA provides instruction on how to determine payment levels
for investigators beyond an admonition to comply with the Anti-Kickback Act.179 From the
industry perspective, Pfizer’s “Policy on Compensation to Investigators in Clinical Trials”
provides that “financial compensation must be reasonable relative to compensation for similar
clinical studies sponsored by the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry in the country where
the research is conducted.”180

6. Physician Payments Sunshine Act
Building on the national outcry for greater transparency in the relationship of industry and physicians, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, pending federal legislation, would
require disclosure of industry payments to physicians on a public website. State legislatures
have already taken the lead in this area of policy reform, with at least five states and the District of Columbia mandating disclosure of industry payments and Massachusetts, Minnesota,
and Vermont also requiring that such payments be made public.181 There are also at least two
states which require that information about a clinical trial’s funding be provided to prospective
participants.182
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, which has received broad support from consumer, provider, and industry groups, would “provide for transparency in the relationship between
physicians and manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical supplies for which
payment is made under Medicare, Medicaid, or SCHIP.”183 In addition to bills introduced in
the Senate in January 2009 and the House in July 2009, there are several other versions of the
Act, as it has been incorporated into the various health reform bills and proposals.184 Under
all versions, manufacturers would be required to report payments or other transfers of value
made to a physician.185 They would also be required to report the physician’s name, address,
and specialty, the form and nature of the payment, and, if the payment is related to a particular drug, the name of the drug. The information would be posted on a website searchable by
physician and location, in a manner that is clear and understandable, and easy to aggregate and
download.186 This website would serve as a valuable resource to policy-makers, prosecutors,
and others with an interest in industry-physician financial relationships, although it would not
substitute for investigators’ disclosure of their financial ties directly to their institutions or
to prospective research participants. Under certain versions of the Act, funding for clinical
research and payments made pursuant to product development agreements would not be disclosed until after the clinical trial has been completed.187

B.

Government Oversight
1. The Failure of Administrative Agency Oversight

Government regulation of financial incentives for clinical trial recruitment and enrollment is poorly enforced.188 Recent government investigations reveal that neither the NIH nor
FDA is adequately enforcing extant conflict of interest regulations. A January 2009 OIG
report concluded, among other findings, that: (i) the FDA does not routinely review financial
information as part of its onsite inspections; (ii) the FDA cannot determine whether it has
financial information for all clinical investigators because it does not have a complete list of
investigators; (iii) when financial interests are disclosed, the FDA responds inconsistently, if
at all; and (iv) 42% of marketing applications approved by the FDA were missing required
financial information.189
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Likewise, a January 2008 OIG report leveled similar criticisms at the NIH, finding that:
(i) NIH could not provide an accurate count of the conflict of interest reports it received from
2004 to 2006; (ii) NIH did not know what type of conflicts existed because for the most part
grantee institutions’ disclosures included no details; and (iii) NIH follow up on reported conflicts was inconsistent and infrequent.190

2. Enforcement Actions and Settlement Agreements
Over the course of the past six months, federal and state prosecutors have focused their
attention on the arena of clinical research, bringing major enforcement actions that seek to
change particular company practices and, in the case of the prosecution in New Jersey against
the Synthes Corporation, to effect reform of payment practices. While these cases have yielded important results and signal a mounting government focus on misconduct in research, they
cannot provide the kind of systemic change or prospective guidance needed to frame federal
policy on recruitment and enrollment or conflicts of interest. Moreover, enforcement actions
identify specific investigator and institutional behaviors that the government deems illegal, but
do not articulate best practices generally.191
The enforcement action that most clearly sought to achieve broader reform was the case
brought by the New Jersey Attorney General against Synthes. Many physicians who had conducted clinical research on the Synthes device ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk approved by
the FDA in 2006, stood to benefit financially if the device gained FDA approval.192 In May
2009, the New Jersey Attorney General entered into a settlement agreement with Synthes,
ProDisc’s manufacturer.193 The Attorney General alleged that Synthes had violated the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by compensating physician-investigators with company stock and
failing to disclose physician-investigators’ financial interests to the FDA, as required by federal regulations. Under the settlement agreement, Synthes must submit all financial interest
information, as defined in the FDA’s conflict of interest regulations, to the IRB as part of each
clinical investigator’s initial IRB submission packet and/or request for approval. Through
its contracts with clinical investigators, Synthes must obligate investigators to disclose their
financial interests to research participants, if so required by the IRB reviewing the clinical trial.194 When the FDA approves a Synthes device for marketing, the company must also disclose
any physician-investigator financial interests to the general public via its website. Finally, the
settlement agreement bars the company from reimbursing investigators with stock.195 Concluding that the practice of compensating investigators with stock creates an “unacceptable
conflict of interest,” the Attorney General called upon federal regulators to address the practice
at the national level. Recently, the New Jersey Attorney General has also launched investigations into the financial interests of investigators who performed studies for the device makers
DePuy Orthopaedics and Medtronic.196
In a 2008 settlement, Biovail Pharmaceuticals pled guilty to federal kickback and conspiracy charges for using sham studies to obtain physician loyalty to their product.197 Specifically, Biovail used a “study,” called the PLACE Program, as a mechanism to pay physicians to
prescribe or recommend the drug Cardizem, L.A. to control high blood pressure. The Program
essentially required participating physicians to prescribe Cardizem, L.A. to a cohort of patients
about whom the prescriber would then complete two short multiple choice surveys over three
patient visits. The physicians’ payment was based upon the number of patients enrolled in the
cohort and completion of the questionnaires – the more patients for whom the physician prescribed Cardizem, L.A., the more money the physician received from the manufacturer. The
U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts determined that the payments of up to one thousand dollars
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exceeded the fair market value of the medical prescribers’ time necessary for the required
tasks, assuming the study was even valid. Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney alleged that the program was not designed or implemented in a way to provide new or meaningful scientific data
about Cardizem, L.A., but solely to increase the number of prescriptions generated.

3. Lawsuits and Settlements
Research participants who believe they have been harmed by investigator conflicts of
interest have limited legal recourse. Courts have held that injured research participants cannot
assert a claim for violation of the federal regulations designed to protect them,198 but, in some
cases, have allowed state law claims to proceed for lack of informed consent where the investigator stood to benefit financially from the positive outcome of a clinical investigation in which
he or she is involved – e.g., where the investigator had money riding on the outcome – and the
plaintiff was not informed of the conflict prior to consenting to participate.
For example, in Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, the estates and surviving
relatives of deceased cancer patients who had participated in a clinical trial sued the Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (the Hutch) and researchers, asserting that the defendants’
failure to disclose the risks of trial participation and the financial interests of the Hutch and
researchers involved in the study violated the rights of trial participants.199 The clinical trial
tested use of a monoclonal antibody to reduce the risk of graft-versus-host disease in bone marrow transplant recipients.200 In fact, the antibody caused graft rejections, cancer relapses, and
new cancers, which the plaintiffs alleged caused premature death in trial participants. According to a Seattle Times exposé, the Hutch had licensed the commercial rights to the antibody
being studied to a start-up company called Genetic Systems but retained a royalty interest.201
The Hutch and the three researchers involved in the trial also held stock in Genetic Systems.
In addition, one of the researchers had a seat on the Genetic Systems’ scientific advisory board,
another was employed as the company’s medical director in addition to working for the Hutch,
and the third was a consultant to the company.
The District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected the plaintiffs’ federal
claims for violation of rights arising from the regulations governing human subject research
as well as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki,202 but allowed the state law
fraud and informed consent claims to proceed to trial.203 The court ultimately rejected the
fraud claim based on failure to prove the existence of the financial conflicts asserted.204 On the
issue of informed consent, the jury found for the defendants, concluding that the participants
had given their consent, and that a reasonably prudent fully informed person in their position
would have made the choice to participate in the clinical trial.205
In another significant case, the court agreed to hear claims based in gross negligence and
deceit where a hospital and physician-investigator failed to disclose a financial interest in the
outcome of clinical research. In May 1999, Roger Darke died in a VEGF-2 gene therapy program conducted by Dr. Jeffrey Isner, chief of cardiovascular research at St. Elizabeth’s Medical
Center, within twenty-four hours of undergoing surgery in which the therapy was delivered.
His widow brought suit against the hospital and doctors, alleging that had Darke known that
a previous patient had died, and of the financial interests of the hospital and the physicianinvestigator, he would not have participated in the experimental program.206 Neither Isner nor
the hospital disclosed to Darke or his wife, as part of the informed consent process, that, “if
the gene therapy program was successful,” they both “stood to profit financially in proportion
to their ownership stake” in a company called Vascular Genetics.207 At the time the suit was
filed, Isner and his heirs owned 20% of Vascular Genetics, which Isner helped found in 1997 to

Seton Hall Law

23

Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
support the experimental gene therapy treatment for coronary artery disease that he developed
(the defendant hospital also owned 20%). The complaint alleged that Darke “was intentionally
and maliciously treated as a human guinea pig in order to generate great financial profits for all
defendants.”208 In June 2004, a Massachusetts Superior Court held that the doctor and hospital
could be held liable for failing to disclose, as part of the informed consent process, their financial interests in the treatment that they recommended.209
In May 2005, the same court denied the Isner Estate’s210 motion for summary judgment
on Darke’s gross negligence claim, holding that enough evidence had been presented to support the allegation that Isner’s financial stake in the success of the gene therapy treatment may
have compromised how the clinical trial was conducted.211 It also held that there was sufficient
evidence to go forward with a deceit claim, for failure to disclose the financial relationships to
Darke and his wife.212
Although it did not see the inside of a courthouse, one of the most well-known informed
consent cases involved the death of an 18-year old volunteer with ornithine transcarbamylase
deficiency, Jesse Gelsinger, who died during his participation in a gene transfer study at the
University of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit brought by his father against the university and investigators alleged that the investigators committed fraud by not revealing that a co-investigator,
the University, and other university officials had financial relationships with Genovo, a biotechnology company, and stood to gain financially from the successful use of RDAd vectors.213
The Complaint also alleged that the investigators had failed to inform Jesse of the risks of the
study, that they had failed to inform Jesse or the FDA of adverse events experienced by other
participants in the same trial as well as the death of monkeys in an earlier animal study, and
that the investigators had allowed Jesse to participate in the study despite not meeting the
inclusion criteria due to the fact that his liver was not functioning within the study’s 24-hour
limit.214 Jesse Gelsinger’s father learned that a “principal investigator, James Wilson, owned
stock in... [the] company [he had] founded, which contributed $4 million per year to human
gene therapy research at the University . . . where the experiment took place,” and claimed that
had Gelsinger known about these financial interests, “he would not have [participated] in the
research study.”215 The suit ended in a confidential settlement in 2000, six weeks after it was
filed. In 2005, the University of Pennsylvania and Children’s National Medical Center agreed
to pay over $1 million in a False Claims Act settlement with the federal government, brought
by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to resolve allegations
that the institutions failed to disclose necessary information and misled the government about
the benefits of the treatment (the three physician-investigators – including Wilson – were also
parties to the settlement).216 The federal investigation following Jesse Gelsinger’s death showed
that Wilson withheld more information from the Gelsingers than just his financial interests,
including prior negative test results.217
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THE ROAD TO REFORM
A.

Preliminary Observations

Research is critical to the advancement of medical treatment and health. It must be
structured to produce high quality data that facilitates the assessment of safety and efficacy in
the population for whom the treatment will be used. The good of the enterprise requires that
the clinical trial system sufficiently balance the costs and benefits to physicians and prospective trial participants to ensure the continued sufficient supply of researchers and subjects. The
system must also be imbued with actual and perceived integrity – so that it produces scientifically reliable results, participants are safe, and people trust the system sufficiently to be willing
to participate.
Clinical trial enrollment and recruitment practices are critical to protecting the rights
and interests of enrollees as well as the scientific integrity of research. Potential enrollees are
at risk if the process entails poor compliance with inclusion and exclusion criteria, inadequate
informed consent, or pressure to enter or remain in a clinical trial. As reflected in government
prosecutions and prominent cases that have come to light, these risks are exacerbated by financial incentives provided to investigators or institutions that may undermine their role as trustworthy gatekeepers of clinical research. In the current economic climate, potential enrollees
are also more vulnerable as increasing numbers of individuals seek to participate in research
either as a primary means of access to treatment or as a form of income.
Several premises that drove our analysis merit discussion as a preamble to our recommendations. Conflicts of interest in research are inevitable and do not in themselves signal unethical behavior – the goal is to eliminate those conflicts that pose excessive risk of distortion
in judgment to the detriment of the study or research participant, which would be unethical,
and reduce or manage those conflicts that pose a lesser degree of risk to avoid such distortions
of judgment.218
A general principle upon which our recommendations rest is that economic neutrality
should prevail in compensation for research and reimbursement for treatment. Such a principle
should eliminate the conflicts of interest that arise when the potential profit on research is so
great that it may distort physicians’ judgments to the potential detriment of their patients. This
scenario arises most frequently in one of two ways – when the physician/investigator has some
kind of investment whose value will increase with a successful trial outcome and when the
physician/investigator’s compensation for oversight of a patient in a trial well exceeds what the
physician would be reimbursed if the patient continues treatment.
Physicians, lawyers, and ethicists alike generally agree that the opportunity to profit
through an equity interest in the product that is subject to trial should be avoided entirely or
in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances, in which case research subjects should be
informed of these interests. Furthermore, fair market valuations of physician time should be
comparable on an hourly or global basis to compensation for clinical work, to avoid the potential that research is more lucrative than treatment, and the attendant risk that such differences
in compensation could factor into physician judgment.219 This is particularly important because of the frequency with which physicians are referring their own patients to clinical trials,
which also increases the likelihood of the therapeutic misconception on the part of patients/
participants.

Seton Hall Law

25

Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
An overall bias of this section is that conflicts of interest in research are best addressed
through the regulatory process, rather than through prosecutorial enforcement of laws such as
the Anti-Kickback law.

B.

Taking Stock: Current Oversight

As evidenced throughout this White Paper, the world of clinical research has changed in
dramatic ways, but government oversight has not kept pace. Oversight and guidance of both
investigator conflicts of interest and the recruitment, enrollment, and retention practices such
conflicts could potentially influence is inadequate. Reporting by institutions to government
of investigator conflicts occurs only after the research has been initiated or conducted, with
inadequate information about the nature of the conflict or specific steps taken to eliminate or
minimize the conflict in order to protect participants and research integrity. Current federal
regulations fail to address institutional financial interests that could give rise to a conflict.
Institutional oversight, which exists primarily in academic medical centers, is also inadequate; within academic medicine, policies are not comprehensive; and faculty as well as
institutional compliance with policies has been highly variable.220 Community hospitals by
and large do not have conflicts committees to identify and manage conflicts, and IRBs lack
the guidance, expertise, and in some cases, the information to execute this role effectively.221
Further, for research conducted by individual physicians, physician groups, or private research
institutes, no consensus exists among physicians about what comprises a conflict of interest
and whether conflicts of interest present ethical dilemmas; most physicians deny that their own
behavior is affected by conflicts of interest.222 Finally, there is simply no extant mechanism
either to gather information about compensation for clinical trials and other financial relationships between the sponsors and investigators, or to address any conflicts of interest that could
influence recruitment and enrollment prior to commencement, much less completion, of the
trial.

C.

Government Reform

Government should undertake certain basic reforms to raise physician awareness about
conflicts of interest, to bar forms of compensation for research that generate the greatest risk
to participants, to provide guidance for managing other forms of compensation and financial
interests held by investigators and institutions, and to increase transparency among all of the
stakeholders involved with any particular trial. Government must also enhance its oversight of
the recruitment, enrollment and retention practices attendant to clinical research, seeking more
information about the conflicts at an earlier stage of the research process.

1. Compensation for Research
Per Capita Payments and Global Payments. Payments per enrollee (“per capita payments”) or global payment for the research project are common forms of reimbursement for
clinical trials for research conducted within academic medicine and in community settings.
While per capita payments create a direct incentive to recruit individual enrollees, the incentive is not problematic as long as the payment is not excessive. Likewise, global payments are
an important vehicle to fund research as long as the amount of payment is appropriate and the
calculation to determine compensation is well-delineated.
Current federal policy for per capita and global payments, although requiring FMV valuation, does not provide sufficient guidance about the methodology or principles by which fair
market value for research compensation should be determined.223 Federal and state policy
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statements, developed in the context of anti-kickback laws, are the primary regulations that
guide FMV for research compensation. HHS should provide prospective, clear guidance for
FMV in the context of clinical research.
Under the broad umbrella of the concept of FMV, businesses and personal services can
be valued in different ways, including: (i) the classic economic formulation of whatever a willing buyer and willing seller agree upon in an arms-length negotiation; (ii) the average price set
by the market of similarly situated buyers and sellers; or (iii) a calculation of projected costs.224
In the research setting, costs could include the cost of services provided by physicians, nurses
and others, tests, procedures, and drugs, devices, and materials, staff training, the informed
consent process, data collection, and adverse event reporting.
In the arena of financial relationships between industry and physicians, the first methodology has often yielded excessive payments for honoraria, travel, consulting fees, speakers
bureau and advisory board participation, and other activities; these excessive payments have
been widely recognized as a means to influence physicians’ decisions about prescribing, recommendations by opinion leaders in the context of medical education, and physicians’ conclusions in published study results. As highlighted by prominent prosecutions, payment for
research – particularly for post-market “seeding” studies – may also be designed primarily to
influence prescribing patterns.225 Overall, the payments for services to physicians, particularly
in Phase IV trials that are most vulnerable to abuse as seeding studies, may have been inflated
to yield a “market” result that encompasses the potential to influence referrals and change
practice patterns. For this reason, neither the free market model of exchange between willing
sellers and buyers nor the prices set by the aggregate of such transactions for particular types
of studies should be used as the benchmark to set compensation for clinical research.
We recommend that the benchmark for compensation for physician services for research
should be comparable payment for time and services for treatment. This will compensate
physicians fairly for their time and services, and will assure that there are no hidden bonuses
or incentives for physicians to recruit patients into research or to refer them to research rather
than treatment. The determination of compensation should take into account factors such as
geographic region, years in practice, board certification, and specialty.226 Significantly too, in
order to avoid a disincentive for physicians to conduct research, the calculation of compensation for a clinical trial should include delineated reimbursement for all other expenses, including tests or interviews to screen patients, time seeking informed consent, tracking of enrollee
participation, and data collection and reporting. Within academic medicine, the infrastructure
is in place to undertake these responsibilities; for physicians in the community the costs may
be different due to the need to hire staff to undertake these responsibilities or the need for physicians to perform certain tasks themselves. It is appropriate for per capita payments to include
a factor for start up costs such as study design, patient recruitment, and staff training incurred,
before participants are enrolled.
To accomplish this end, HHS should issue regulations that require payment neutrality
as between treatment and research. The regulations should set forth a guiding principle that
physicians and institutions should be fairly compensated for all legitimate aspects of research
while avoiding payments that are excessive and may exert an undue influence on participant
recruitment or other aspects of the clinical trials. In addition, federal guidelines should identify any expenses that are not permissible, provide guidance about factors such as geography
and specialty that may be considered in setting FMV compensation, and require that the FMV
calculation for per capita and global payments be set forth in writing.
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Setting Limits – Other Payment Methodologies for Research. Per capita and global
payments are acceptable approaches to compensate health care professionals and institutions
for research. However, other methods of compensation create a direct conflict between the
financial interests of investigators and the interests of potential participants and should be
prohibited by federal regulation.
Finder’s Fees. Professional organizations have rejected finder’s fees as ethically unacceptable.227 These fees comprise payments to physicians, nurses, medical students and other
participants in the research project solely for referring individuals to participate in a trial.
While the frequency of such fees is debated, a recent survey of clinical research coordinators
found that such fees are still used.228
HHS should bar any payment solely for a referral to a research trial as well as any payment methodology for screening potential participants or other services that conditions payment on the individual enrolling in the trial. Under this formulation, payment for screening
participants on medical and psychosocial grounds could be reimbursed at FMV provided that
the payment is made regardless of whether the person decides to enroll in the trial or is eligible
to participate once screening tests and analysis are performed. Fees solely for the referral create an incentive to refer individuals regardless of whether they are appropriate for the study,
a risk that is especially problematic when physicians with a long-term relationship with their
patients refer them to research. Moreover, given that Medicare and Medicaid pay for the tests
and elements of research that are standard treatment, finder’s fees are likely to violate the federal and state Anti-Kickback laws, although this may not be well-understood by health care
professionals.229
Bonuses for Recruitment and Retention. Like finder’s fees, bonuses for recruiting a
certain number of participants, meeting research recruitment goals in a particular timeframe,
or retaining patients, create a direct conflict of interest by incentivizing physicians to recruit
and retain individual patients to meet the bonus quotas or goals. The federal government
should articulate the risks to potential enrollees and bar these forms of payment in research.
Payment with Equity. Payment of physicians who conduct research with equity in the
research sponsor gives physicians a financial interest in the outcome of the clinical trial, creating significant risks both to enrollees and to the scientific integrity of the research. The federal
government should prohibit this form of payment to physicians and other researchers, those in
positions to affect the conduct of the research, or to entities conducting the research.230

2. Addressing Other Conflicts of Interest in Research
In addition to federal guidance for compensation for research, the current framework
for federal policy to oversee investigators’ conflicts of interest should be revised to specify
conflicts that will disqualify a researcher from serving as an investigator. Further, regulations should enumerate requirements for identifying and managing other conflicts arising from
the varied and frequent financial relationships between industry and physicians. Apart from
payment for research, drug, device, and biotechnology companies that sponsor research may
also provide other funding or remuneration to investigators, including honoraria for speaking
engagements, consulting fees, payment for travel time and expenses, payment for service on
an advisory board, and compensation for their intellectual contributions in the form of equity
holdings or ownership rights in products (for example, royalty, patent, or license rights).
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As proposed by the AAMC and most recently by the IOM Committee, holdings by investigators or their immediate family members231 that provide a direct interest in the outcome of
the research, such as stock or stock options in a privately held company or equity in a publicly
traded company above a de minimis amount, should be barred absent a compelling rationale
to permit the conflict.232 The same policy should apply to intellectual property interests in a
drug, device or other product investigated by the clinical trial. These holdings by investigators
or their immediate family members give them a personal direct stake in the outcome of the
research, which creates both the appearance of improper influence and the risk that the financial benefits, which can be substantial, could adversely affect both the interests of enrollees as
well as the scientific integrity of the research. Only in circumstances where the research could
not be conducted effectively or safely without the individual’s participation, should an exception be allowed.233 Such cases presumably will be rare, arising, for example, when a physician
has designed a device and is needed to consult on the surgical procedures for its implantation.
In such instances, the physician should serve as a consultant rather than an investigator, and
should not participate in key aspects of the research, including recruitment and enrollment,
informed consent, and data collection and analysis. Instead, the physician should provide his
or her technical expertise without playing other significant roles, as detailed in a written plan
for managing the conflict. Moreover, where such intellectual property holdings are allowed,
the FDA should be notified of the conflict, as well as the plan to reduce and manage it, prior to
the commencement of research.
Service by a physician-investigator or immediate family members on the board of directors or as an officer of the company that sponsors the research or holds equity interests or
ownership rights should also bar the physician-investigator from participating in the research,
unless his or her technical expertise is essential to involvement as a consultant, as discussed
above. Physician-investigators who play other leadership roles in privately-held, smaller
corporations, including service on an advisory board or speakers bureau, or as a consultant,
should also be barred from participating in the research, absent compelling circumstances in
which participation should be limited to a consultant capacity, with prior notice to the FDA.
Frequently, small closely-held companies are created to spin off the product research portion
of an investigator’s scientific work. These companies typically have a substantial stake in the
outcome of the research through ownership rights in the product.
For publicly-held corporations, service on an advisory board or other financial relationships with the sponsor may also give rise to conflicts that must be addressed, although they
fall short of requiring a ban on the relationship. Instead, conflicts committees should carefully
scrutinize and evaluate the nature and longevity of the service and the amount of payments
both historically and going forward in determining how to manage the conflict, and the federal
government should adopt a mechanism for auditing such situations.

D.

Enhancing Institutional Oversight of Conflicts of Interest

While government regulation can and should set policy parameters and direction and
establish an effective audit process, institutional oversight of conflicts of interest will remain
the primary vehicle to identify and manage conflicts of interest held by investigators and the
institutions themselves. As reflected in recent congressional investigations and studies of institutional practice, a gap exists between recommended practices and policy adoption and adherence within academic medical centers.234 It is clear that academic medical centers have also
fallen short in implementing reporting policies effectively through the creation of systems to
collect information about investigator interests and to monitor compliance by investigators.
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Institutional efforts to track investigators’ financial relationships with industry will no doubt
be enhanced by passage of national legislation requiring public reporting of physician/industry financial relationships. Public disclosure of payments by industry to physicians will be
especially valuable in addressing conflicts of interest outside of academic medicine, where no
system exists to report on conflicts of interest until after the research has been completed.
As reflected in studies of current practices and government investigations, financial relationships between industry and physician-investigators are prevalent, including payment for
honoraria, consulting, travel, and continuing medical education.235 Institutions should evaluate each of these relationships to determine if the magnitude and form of the payment, the
longevity of the relationship, or other factors suggest that the physician’s relationship with the
sponsor should be terminated or renegotiated or that the conflict of interest compels a different
role for the physician in prospective research involving that sponsor.

1. Addressing Investigator Conflicts of Interest within Academic Medicine:
Challenges and Solutions
Federal regulations as well as recommendations by the AAMC, the AAU and, most
recently, the IOM provide a framework and guidance for institutional oversight of investigator
conflicts of interests within academic medical centers. Under PHS guidelines, institutions are
required to take steps to manage, reduce or eliminate any conflict of interest posed by a financial interest that meets the definition of “significant.” However, the regulations do not obligate
investigators to report all financial interests to the institution, do not require a written plan to
manage all interests deemed to create a conflict, and do not require that the institution report
the nature or extent of the conflict to PHS. Nor do the regulations state a process for review,
substantive limits on the kinds of conflicts that may exist, or a required minimum response for
conflicts that pose the greatest risks to participants and the integrity of the research.
Appropriately, HHS has sought recommendations to tighten and revise federal requirements for such oversight.236 In particular, the Request for Comments issued by HHS in May
2009 sought comments on a wide range of issues, including: (i) whether certain financial interests should be automatically reported to the institution rather than leave it up to each investigator to determine if the interests would “reasonably appear to be affected by the research”;
(ii) whether all interests should be reviewed by an institutional committee; (iii) whether institutions should be required to create special conflicts of interest committees to review the
information and make recommendations; and (iv) whether the regulations should bar certain
conflicts or specify how they must be managed.
We recommend that investigators should be required to report all financial interests to an
institutional committee for review regardless of the amount of the interests, rather than leaving it up to investigators to determine if the interest could reasonably be expected to affect the
research. In fact, in order to be effective, institutions need to establish an internal database
that investigators must update as information changes about their financial relationships with
for-profit entities. While aggregating the information for all potential investigators is a massive
undertaking for academic medical centers, it is the only effective means to address potential
conflicts of interest proactively.
Federal policy should require that a committee review and manage conflicts of interest,
and should specify requirements for the committee’s expertise and obligations. The issue of
whether a special conflicts of interest committee should be created to review and manage the
conflicts is complex, and should be left up to the judgment of individual institutions. On the
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one hand, a separate committee could bring additional expertise in financial arrangements.
IRBs often lack this experience because they are often heavily comprised of clinicians. Conflicts committees may be farther removed from the clinicians whose research proposals are
reviewed by the IRB. As a result, they may be more objective or more willing to act on conflicts that create either the appearance of a conflict or a risk of undue influence that may not be
identified by clinicians immersed in research themselves. On the negative side of the equation,
conflicts committees add a separate organizational structure and step to a process already
criticized as too slow. If given additional resources, at least some IRBs could no doubt handle
the additional responsibility in a process that is more streamlined. Giving IRBs the responsibility for managing conflicts, rather than creating a separate committee, may be especially
valuable at community hospitals that do not conduct extensive research. In order to carry out
the responsibility of overseeing conflicts of interest, IRBs could create a subcommittee that
comprises individuals with financial expertise. If a separate conflicts committee is charged
to address conflicts of interest, information about investigator conflicts for particular clinical
trials should be reported to the IRB to inform its review of the proposed clinical trial as well
as its obligation to review informed consent documents.
Finally, federal regulations bar any member of the IRB who has a “conflicting interest”
from participating in review of a protocol.237 With guidance set by federal regulation, IRB
policies should clearly delineate the interests that would be deemed “conflicting,” encompassing the broad array of financial relationships between industry and physicians.

2. Addressing Institutional Conflicts of Interest within Academic
Medical Centers
As recognized in the recent IOM Committee report, institutional conflicts of interest
have received far less scrutiny and attention from policymakers and others than the conflicts of
investigators.238 Nonetheless, the recommendations of the AAMC and AAU provide important
guidance, proposing that institutional conflicts, like investigator conflicts, should be identified,
reviewed, and as needed, managed or eliminated. Significantly, the AAMC and AAU recommendations establish a rebuttable presumption that the institution should not conduct research
if a conflict exists due to the financial interests of the institution or those in key leadership
positions such as deans, department chairs, and division heads.239 Noting that institutional
officers, such as the chief executive officer or the officers who oversee grants or technology
transfer, may have an interest in strengthening the financial performance of the institution, the
IOM Committee proposed that a committee or subcommittee of the board of directors should
be charged to oversee the conflicts because of the board’s fiduciary duty to the institution and
greater distance from day-to-day management.
We agree with the IOM recommendation that a committee of the board of directors
should oversee institutional conflicts of interest in research. Members who serve on the committee should be independent of management. The board committee’s oversight should extend
beyond the primary institutions, such as the medical school or university, to any not-for-profit
institutes or for-profit corporate entities that are substantially controlled by or operate under
the auspices of the medical school or university. These entities may receive substantial grants
from industry or hold equity and property interests in the products studied in clinical trials
by these entities or by the university or medical school. They also may have a small board of
directors personally invested in or identified with the financial success of the entity.
The board committee charged to oversee institutional conflicts should produce general
conflict of interest policies that are available to all, both within and outside the institution;
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ideally, they should be posted on the institution’s website. Like the committee that manages
investigator conflicts, the board committee should report its findings and conclusions regarding any particular investigator or proposed trial to the IRB. As with management of investigator conflicts, effectively overseeing institutional conflicts will depend in the first instance on
capturing the relevant interests across the many parts of the institution where they may arise:
the office of technology transfer, the development office, the grants office, grants to individual
departments or their chairs, and the holdings of executive management.

3. Overseeing Conflicts of Interest in the Community Setting
In community settings, FDA and PHS require sponsors and investigators to be responsible for the review and management of investigator conflicts of interest prior to the time that
research begins. Independent IRBs do not necessarily see conflicts review as part of their
responsibilities, and, as with the rest of the IRB process, no government agency reviews IRB
decisions at the time they are made to ensure that the IRB is acting appropriately. Institutional
conflicts of interest are unregulated. We recommend that the FDA and PHS regulations be
revised to set forth guidelines for the process and substance of conflicts of interest review in
community settings. Such regulations would need to include a provision requiring physicians
to make relevant financial information available for review.
Outside of academic medicine, private research institutes, companies that sponsor research, or CROs or SMOs retained by the sponsor, oversee the conduct of research projects. By
and large, conflicts committees do not exist to review potential conflicts held by the investigator or the entity, such as a physicians group, conducting the research. The sponsor, or a CRO or
SMO acting as its agent, is ill-suited to review conflicts of interest that are generated through
either the means or magnitude of payment for research or by other financial relationships with
investigators.
IRBs, whether independent or based in a community hospital or other facility, should be
charged with the review of conflicts of interest held by investigators and entities conducting research in community settings. IRBs could create a separate committee on conflicts of interest
with appropriate expertise to establish policies for the IRB’s conflicts review. Alternatively,
conflicts committees acting as a subcommittee of the IRB or as a separate committee could review individual protocols. Reviewing conflicts of interest and formulating recommendations
about managing the conflicts is a substantial additional responsibility that should be reflected
in additional fees for protocol review to assure that IRBs have the resources to undertake this
task.
Assigning this responsibility to independent IRBs is an imperfect solution; but it is also
the only possible avenue that could serve this function. As commentators have pointed out,
sponsors or CROs and SMOs acting on their behalf can manipulate the system of IRB review
by choosing IRBs that have a reputation or practice for lax review.240 Independent IRBs are
for-profit entities; some may place the financial success of the entity above the need to devote
extensive resources to thorough review of each protocol. At the same time, other commentators have noted that independent IRBs often operate more efficiently than IRBs in academic
medicine; the IRB membership is smaller, the meetings are more frequent, the members are
compensated for their time, in contrast to their counterparts in academic medicine, and a
stream of revenue supports the activity. In addition, IRBs in academic medicine and community hospitals face their own distinct pressures, including the fact that the IRB members
are reviewing the research proposals of their peers and colleagues, and serve on the IRB in
addition to their other responsibilities.
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Federal regulations should provide clear guidance to IRBs about the nature and scope
of information they should review, the standards for the review, and the alternatives for eliminating, minimizing, or managing a conflict. This guidance should apply to conflicts of interest facing both investigators and institutions, such as physician groups and private research
institutes. By and large, federal regulations and policies should be similar for IRBs within
and outside academic medicine. As with academic medicine, institutional conflicts of interest
should be broadly defined to include both financial interests held by the institution as well as
financial interests of leadership within the institution and their spouses and children. In addition, since physician practices and research centers or institutes are far smaller in terms of size
and diversity of revenue, revenues from the sponsor for research or for any other purpose that
exceed a specified threshold of the overall revenue of the entity should preclude the site from
participation in research. Federal regulations should also spell out clearly the obligation of
physicians or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for
research and other financial interests to IRBs or conflicts committees.

4. Achieving Transparency
Consistent with the national movement towards transparency in industry-physician relationships, federal law should require disclosure of payments for conducting clinical trials and
other relevant financial interests. Specifically, before research commences, sponsors should
report to the FDA and academic institutions should report to the granting federal agency equity
and ownership interests as well as all payments, above a de minimis amount, to the investigator and the investigator’s institution or practice group by the company whose product is under
review in the clinical trial. Federal policy should consider mandating disclosure to potential
enrollees of the method of compensation for research as well as information about conflicts of
interest held by investigators and institutions.241

5. Enhanced Training for Investigators
Current federal guidelines provide no specific requirements for conflicts of interest
training for individuals who serve as investigators within or outside academic medicine. Yet
studies of physician knowledge and awareness of financial conflicts of interest demonstrate the
need for specific training about the nature of conflicts, the potential harm, and the ways that
conflicts can be managed or eliminated.242 This training should be mandatory for all investigators who conduct clinical research within and outside of academic medical centers.
In addition, physicians in community settings who conduct research often have limited
training in or understanding of research methodology, the ethical underpinnings of research, or
the differences in their roles as treating physician and as research investigator.243 For this reason, for physician investigators outside of academic medicine who conduct research, training
should cover key elements of research: the importance of inclusion and exclusion criteria and
informed consent, the ethical and scientific issues posed by particular research methods such
as double blind placebo-controlled studies, and their obligations as an investigator compared
to their role as a treating physician. This training should be mandatory for all investigators,
except those who conduct only a limited number of hours of research in a given year or are not
involved in enrollment and recruitment or data analysis.
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[hereinafter “Compliance Guidance”] (providing that clinical trial agreements “should be structured to fit in the
personal services safe harbor whenever possible.”).
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Appendices
Appendix A
Summary of March 23 Forum on
Enrollment and Recruitment into Clinical Trials
On March 23, 2009, the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy at Seton Hall
Law School hosted a Forum to address the ethical, legal and policy issues posed by recruitment
and enrollment of human subjects into clinical research. Entitled, Protecting Participants,
Advancing Science: An Agenda for Reform of Clinical Research Recruitment and Enrollment,
the Forum brought together leaders from academic medicine, industry, academia, consumer
organizations, legal and ethics experts and government representatives. The goal of the Forum
was to inform the Center’s work on articles and white papers laying out recommendations for
public policy and institutional practices to enhance protection for research participants and the
scientific integrity of clinical research.
The Forum began with a presentation by Carl Coleman, J.D., Professor of Law, Seton
Hall University School of Law, on “The Legal Framework for Recruitment and Enrollment,”
in which he described the current state of federal regulation of human subjects recruitment.
Tracy Miller, J.D., Executive Director of the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
presented a summary of key empirical evidence related to disclosure of physician financial
incentives to prospective research participants, entitled “Physician Financial Incentives: What
do the Data Show?” Following these presentations, the participants covered several key topics
posed by recruitment and enrollment of human subjects into clinical research: (i) physicianinvestigator payments and recruitment incentives, including finder’s fees, recruitment and
retention bonuses, and per capita payments and the implications of such payments for the
interests of participants; (ii) disclosure of compensation for research and other financial
interests of investigators and institutions to participants in research, and to IRBs; and (iii)
financial incentives for participants in research. On each topic, the Forum participants shared
their diverse perspectives and expertise, and explored common ground for concrete, practical
solutions to advance the protections accorded participants in clinical trials.
On the first topic, many of the Forum participants noted that bonuses for recruitment
and retention are problematic; some questioned how widely used they are at this time. In terms
of finder’s fees for referring individuals into a study, a clear distinction was made between fair
market value compensation for time spent screening and educating patients about the study and
payment solely for a referral which should not be acceptable. Widespread agreement supported
per capita payments, with some participants recognizing the lack of a clear methodology for
such payments, especially outside the context of academic medicine.
On the topic of disclosing financial interests to participants in research, the Forum
participants expressed a range of views. For example, some expressed the opinion that disclosure
might further complicate an already complex informed consent process. Others advocated far
more explicit disclosure than has occurred to date, arguing that participants in practice and
in studies conducted on attitudes about disclosure have not been given the information that
is most salient – information about the magnitude or amount of the compensation paid. Some
thought potential participants would not have a context to understand this information. Overall,
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the discussion recognized that disclosure by itself is not an adequate response to conflicts of
interest, but must be paired with enhanced oversight by government, including clearer policy
guidance for the obligations of institutions to identify and manage conflicts of interest.
Addressing the issue of incentives and payment for human subjects in clinical trials,
many of the Forum participants agreed that the prevailing regulatory framework which prohibits
any compensation that would unduly influence the decision to enter a trial, is unrealistic
and unfair to clinical trials participants. Overall, many participants urged that the existing
regulatory framework should be revisited and reformulated. Researchers, employees of the
sponsor, and others who are part of the chain leading up to and conducting the trial are all paid
for their participation. Those who enroll should be paid as well for their time, inconvenience,
and discomfort. However, on this latter point, several of the participants noted the dilemma
of paying for discomfort and risk, because while it is the reality of how patients are recruited
to undertake certain studies, higher payment for greater risks may also be an inducement
for lower income or more vulnerable individuals to undertake risks that may result in harm,
without the prospect of reimbursement by the sponsor or the entity conducting the research.

Participants at the Forum on
Enrollment and Recruitment into Clinical Trials
Gary Budney, BS, Senior Director Compliance & Business Practices,
Schering-Plough Corporation
Cathryn Clary, MD, Vice President U.S. External Medical Affairs, Pfizer Inc.
Nancy Dubler, LLB, Consultant for Ethics New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
and Senior Associate, Montefiore-Einstein Center for Bioethics		
Susan H. Ehringhaus, JD, Associate General Counsel, Regulatory Counsel,
Association of American Medical Colleges		
Terry Fadem, MS, Managing Director, Corporate Alliances,
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine			
Felix A. Khin-Maung-Gyi, PharmaD, MBA, CEO, Chesapeake Research Review
Arthur Levin, MPH, Director, Center for Medical Consumers
Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, Director, Office of Human Research Protections,
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services		
Mary Monovoukas, JD, Senior Director, Corporate Counsel, Boston Scientific Corporation
Lori Queisser, BS, Senior Vice President Global Compliance & Business Practices,
Schering-Plough Corporation				
		
Denise V. Rodgers, MD, Provost & Executive Vice President,
University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey
Adil Shamoo, PhD, Professor, University of Maryland School of Medicine,
Co-Founder, CIRCARE		
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Jay P. Siegel, MD, Group President, Research & Development, President,
Centocor Research & Development, Johnson & Johnson
Jeffrey H. Silverstein, MD, Professor, Vice Chair for Research, Department of
Anesthesiology, Mount Sinai School of Medicine
Marjorie Speers, PhD, President & CEO, AAHRPP					
David H. Strauss, MD, Professor & Director, Office of Human Subjects Research,
Columbia University Medical Center
Michelle Weiner, JD, Deputy Attorney General, Affirmative Litigation Section,
State of New Jersey, Department of Law & Public Safety
Alan Wertheimer, PhD, Senior Research Scholar, Department of Bioethics, Clinical Center,
National Institutes of Health

Participants from Seton Hall Law School
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Kathleen M. Boozang, JD, LLM, Associate Dean for Academic Advancement &
Professor of Law
Carl Coleman, JD, Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Center for Health &
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Tracy Miller, JD,* Executive Director, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Kate Greenwood, JD, Faculty Researcher, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical
Law & Policy
Valerie Gutmann, JD, Faculty Researcher, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical
Law & Policy

* Ms. Miller served as Executive Director through September 4, 2009.
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Appendix B
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy at Seton Hall University Law
School advances scholarship and recommendations for public policy on cutting edge issues
posed by pharmaceutical and health law. The Center also serves as a forum to convene leaders in government, industry, academia, medicine and consumer organizations to examine the
issues posed by clinical and policy developments and explore potential solutions. The Center
builds upon the nationally recognized scholarship in health law, conferences on key public
policy questions, and an internationally recognized healthcare compliance training program
that are part of the Health Law & Policy Program at Seton Hall Law School.
The Center:
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•

Researches, reviews, and develops policy recommendations on key issues on health
and pharmaceutical law to inform and shape policy at the state and national levels;

•

Produces scholarship through journal publication and white papers on emerging legal, ethical, and social issues in health and pharmaceutical law;

•

Provides a neutral forum to convene leaders in government, industry, academia, and
medicine to engage in an informed dialogue, consider pressing policy questions, and
explore potential solutions;

•

Offers educational programs on health and pharmaceutical issues by leading experts
from the public and private sectors to examine important policy and legal issues;
and

•

Holds compliance education and training programs on state, federal and international regulatory requirements that govern the research, approval, promotion, and
sale of drugs and devices.

•

The Center operates under the direction of Associate Dean and Professor Kathleen
Boozang, Executive Director of Global Healthcare Compliance & Ethics Education Simone Handler-Hutchinson, and Staff. In addition to their expertise in public
policy, health and pharmaceutical law, ethical issues in medicine, and healthcare
compliance, the Center draws upon the intellectual strength of the Seton Hall Law
School faculty. Faculty members bring to the Center s work nationally recognized
expertise in pharmaceutical law, not-for-profit governance, intellectual property law
and bioethics, among other areas.
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Appendix C
Center Financial Disclosure Statement and Policies
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy of Seton Hall Law School is
committed to independent academic inquiry focusing on issues affecting health and pharmaceutical law and policy. As a part of Seton Hall University, the Newark-based Law School is a
nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization. The University and Law School engage in fundraising from
alumni and other contributors. Remaining committed examining divergent perspectives on
policy issues related to health and pharmaceutical law and policy is critical to the mission of
the Center.
Law School faculty members and Center Staff are devoted to academic independence in
their research and transparency in their relationships. As such, funding sources are announced
on all published materials and on the Law School Web site. Regardless of whether financial
support is received in the form of an endowment, as unrestricted funds or for a specific project,
Law School and Center donors are not involved in the academic work of Law School professors
or Center Staff. Grants and donations are only accepted if they do not limit the faculty’s or the
Center’s ability to carry out research free of outside influence and consistent with the Center
s mission and values.
Seton Hall Law School funds the salaries of the faculty associated with The Center for
Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. Research and administrative support for the Center
are jointly funded by Seton Hall Law School and by unrestricted funds provided by corporate
donors, with the Law School currently providing the majority of the funding.
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and its faculty assume sole responsibility for the content of its publications and position statements. The Center does not
issue publications or statements on behalf of any donor or other entity.
The corporate donors that have provided funding to the Center or to the Law School are
listed below.
•

In 2009, Ernst & Young committed $25,000 to support the creation of a European
healthcare compliance program slated to be implemented in 2010.

•

Bristol-Myers Squibb provided a $5 million endowment in 2005 in support of The
Harvey Washington Wiley Chaired Professorship in Corporate Governance &
Business Ethics. The Law School is recruiting candidates for this position.

•

Johnson & Johnson provided $100,000 in 2008 as seed funding for two projects
(i) a program on Strategies for Compliance Professionals: Honing Decision-Making
Skills, and (ii) creation and implementation of an international compliance program.
It provided an additional $50,000 in unrestricted support, also in 2008. In 2007,
Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson provided $49,900 in unrestricted funds. Johnson & Johnson provided $50,000 in 2007
and $100,000 in 2006 in unrestricted funds to support the Center. Two of Johnson
& Johnson s subsidiaries, Centocor, Inc. and Ortho Biotech, provided $125,000 in
unrestricted funding to the Center in 2007.

•

In 2006, sanofi-aventis provided $500,000 to Seton Hall Law School in support
and development of the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and the
programs and activities associated with the Center.
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•

In 2006, Schering-Plough Corporation made a $2.5 million commitment to be paid
over five years to partially endow a tenured track/tenured faculty position dedicated
to health care regulation. The Law School is currently recruiting candidates for this
position in the 2009-2010 academic year.

•

In 2008, Purdue Pharma provided $25,000 in unrestricted funding for the Center for
Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy.

•

In 2008, Roche provided $50,000 for a symposium sponsored by the Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, the Seton Hall Law Review, and the Center on
Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza.
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For further information about
Programs and publications of
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
please visit our website at law.shu.edu

Seton Hall Law

55

The Center for Health &
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Seton Hall University School of Law
One Newark Center
Newark, NJ 07102
Tel: 973-642-8190
law.shu.edu

